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Abstract. Understanding pilots’ monitoring strategies is an important way to improve flight 
safety. We studied the gaze allocation of twenty pilots during sensitive flight phases in an Airbus 
320 full flight simulator. Our objective was to characterize monitoring strategies regarding pilot’s 
status (Captain/First Officer) and pilot’s role (Pilot Flying/Pilot Monitoring). Monitoring 
strategies differed between Captain and First Officer during take-off and automatic landing. 
Monitoring strategies were also contrasted between Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring during go-
around and warning events. When warning events occurred, suboptimal gaze allocation was 
characterized by an over-focus on primary flight parameters. Our results confirmed the 
importance of developing better training programs to enhance pilots’ monitoring skills and 
synergy in complementary monitoring. 
Keywords: Cockpit Monitoring, Disjoint Attention, Eye Tracking, Flight Safety, Gaze 
Allocation, Go-around, Inter-individual Differences, Joint Attention. 
Introduction 
In aviation, human error is a major source of accident, and this cause remains constant over 
decades. The growing role of automation in modern cockpits allowed a drastic diminution of 
aircraft accidents and permitted to significantly lower crews’ workload. At the same time, it has 
introduced new challenges that necessitate research with regard to crew coordination, error 
management, and vigilance (Wickens, Fadden, Merwin, & Ververs, 1998). Automation is 
suspected to provoke a loss of hand-flying capabilities, an increased complacency (Endsley & 
Kiris, 1995; Haslbeck & Hoermann, 2016), and to reduce situation awareness (Parasuraman, 
Molloy & Singh, 1993). These automation drawbacks can be particularly problematic during 
highly dynamic flight phases, non-routine maneuvers, or in particular situations such as 
automation breakdown or when the crew needs to suddenly take over manual operations. 
During their ab-initio training, pilots learn to fly in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), 
i.e., poor visibility conditions that require flying the aircraft by relying on cockpit instruments.
During a flight in IMC, the control of the aircraft is largely based on the monitoring of the
information available in the cockpit. This monitoring consists of different visual scans allowing
a continuous and structured observation of flight instruments. The analysis of these visual
patterns with eye tracking is frequent in human factor studies, in particular to gather information
about monitoring strategies (Dehais, Behrend, Peysakhovich, Causse & Wickens, 2017;
Haslbeck, & Bengler, 2016; Haslbeck, Schubert, Gontar, & Bengler, 2012; Peysakhovich,
Lefrançois, Dehais & Causse, 2016; Reynal, Colineaux, Vernay & Dehais, 2016; Sarter, Mumaw,
& Wickens, 2007).
Monitoring strategies in the cockpit. Monitoring consist of adequately watching, observing, and 
cross-checking. A methodical and efficient visual scan of cockpit instruments is necessary to 
build an up to date situation awareness or to make accurate changes in aircraft flight parameters 
(attitude, altitude, speed etc.). Monitoring also involves a cognitive comparison against the 
expected values, modes, and procedures. Surprisingly, most of ab-initio pilots are rarely trained 
on how to make an efficient and appropriate visual scan on modern glass cockpits. Thus, each 
pilot develops its own monitoring strategies, with more or less efficiency. A previous study of 
Lefrancois, Matton, Gourinat, Peysakhovich, and Causse (2016) suggested that pilots’ scanning 
strategies had an impact on hand flying performances. This study highlighted a high variability 
in visual scanning skills and its impact on flying performances. Yet, during highly dynamic 
phases (such as take-off and landing) or non-routine maneuvers, pilots have to constantly monitor 
instruments in order to be able to make fast and appropriate decisions. Thus an efficient 
monitoring strategy is vital (Kasarskis Stehwien, Hickox, Aretz & Wickens, 2001; Spady, 1978).  
One cockpit, two distinct and complementary roles. On multi crew jet aircraft, the status of the 
two pilots is well known: There is the Captain and the First Officer. The Captain is higher in the 
hierarchy and generally owns significantly more experience than the First Officer on the specific 
aircraft. In addition, each pilot has a dedicated role: flying or monitoring.  
The Pilot Flying’s primary responsibility is to control and monitor the aircraft’s flight path 
(including monitoring the flight guidance automated systems, if engaged). The Pilot Flying is 
secondarily responsible for monitoring non-flight path actions, such as aircraft systems and other 
operational activities. The Pilot Monitoring’s primary responsibility is to monitor the aircraft’s 
flight path (including automation systems, if engaged) and to immediately bring any concern to 
the Pilot Flying’s attention. The Pilot Monitoring is secondarily responsible for accomplishing 
non–flight path actions, such as radio communications and aircraft systems (Flight Safety 
Foundation, 2014). 
During a flight, the two pilots can be alternatively either Pilot Flying or Pilot Monitoring. 
However, for some specific maneuvers, the Captain must be the Pilot Flying, such as during the 
rejected take-off maneuver or the automatic landing in low visibility. Specificity of this 
organization supposes an active “complementary monitoring” and a cross checking of all actions 
by the other crew member (call-out). This repartition also requires predictive monitoring to 
anticipate future aircraft attitude, and to rapidly detect potential visual alarms or deviations of the 
flight parameters. For example, the pilot in charge of monitoring the take-off should produce a 
specific gaze allocation including flight mode annunciator, thrust, and speed, while keeping some 
attention toward some other channel of information. A similar description can be made for other 
dynamic phases of flight such as landing. Besides, non-routine maneuvers like go-around are 
particularly interesting because this “normal” procedure commonly produces a high mental 
workload, creates a strong segregation of the tasks, and a “disjoint monitoring” in the cockpit 
between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring (Adam and Condette, 2013). This cockpit 
disunion commonly results in a poor management of automatism and a lack of teamwork. 
Objectives of the study. In this work, we had several objectives. First of all, we examined pilots’ 
specific gaze allocation according to their role during take-off, potential go-around, sensitive 
maneuvers (e.g., low energy recovering), and warning events (e.g., sink rate alerts) in standard 
visibility. Moreover, we studied gaze allocation during take-off and landing in low visibility 
conditions as the role of the Pilot Monitoring is particularly critical in these conditions. Indeed, 
low visibility conditions require the Captain acting as Pilot Flying. This procedure is complex 
because it requires frequent transitions between external visual references and cockpit 
instruments from the Pilot Flying. Moreover, for the Pilot Monitoring, timely detection of 
abnormal parameters is critical because the flight crew has no external references except the 
runway centerline. We hypothesized that during all studied phases of flight, cockpit should be 
markedly split due to different task allocations. Moreover, we assumed that gaze allocation 
should strongly differ between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring during low visibility 
procedures. In addition, we hypothesized that a sub-optimal gaze allocation could be observed 
during go-around, sensitive maneuvers, or warning events, with the Pilot Flying over-focusing 
on primary flight instrument (specifically the attitude indicator) to the detriment of other flight 
parameters. The Pilot Monitoring might also mainly focus on the primary flight instrument 
instead of short-term trajectory, flight mode annunciator (FMA), or on the evolution of aircraft 
total energy. In order to validate these hypotheses, twenty pilots (10 crews) performed two flight 
scenarios, facing standard and poor weather conditions in a full flight simulator. Pilots’ ocular 
movements were recorded with two head mounted eye-trackers. 
 
Method  
 
Participants. Ten crews consisting of twenty pilots were recruited (10 Captains and 10 First 
Officers) to perform the flight simulator experiment. They were all qualified on Airbus A320. 
All pilots were males, with a mean age of 42.3 years (SD = 3.8 years) for Captains and of 29.2 
years (SD = 2.7 years) for First Officers, with a minimum of 1000 flying hours (FH). They 
totalized an average of 11500 FH (SD = 1300 FH) and 3500 FH (SD = 340 FH), respectively. 
All were volunteers, signed a consent form, and provided demographic information. They were 
not rewarded for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to compose each of the 
ten crews and were not informed about the purpose of the study. Pilots were only briefed with all 
relevant flight parameters and context, but they were not introduced to the scenario, and purpose 
of research.  
Flight simulator. Experiments were conducted in a full flight Airbus 320 simulator (Thomson), 
used for the regular training of professional flight crews provided by Air France group ©. Eye 
movements were recorded during the entire scenario duration, from thrust application during the 
take-off up to the roll out after the landing (when aircraft speed diminished below 50 knots). Eye 
data analysis was focused from “brake release” to “positive rate call-out” for the take-off, and 
from an altitude of 2500 feet up to the touchdown for the landing phase. This choice was made 
for the landing phase because the lower the altitude, the more accurate the Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) beams have to be flown and more visual attention is solicited. We recorded five 
flight parameters in order to characterize performance during the approach: Localizer and glide 
slope deviations, the speed (target value = 138 knots), the height above the runway threshold at 
landing (target value = 50 ft.) and the touchdown point (target values = between 300 and 600 
meters from the runaway threshold). 
Eye tracking. Two synchronized 50Hz Pertech head-mounted eye trackers (0.25 degree of 
accuracy) have been used to record eye movements of the two pilots. Acquisitions were 
performed thanks to EyeTechPilot © software from Pertech. Post-processing has been conducted 
thanks to EyeTechMotion ©, and EyeTechLab © software, also from Pertech. Video and audio 
streams were also collected to analyze interaction and the communication within the flight crew. 
For post-processing purposes, flight displays were divided into nine areas of interests (AOIs; see 
Figure 1). The nine areas of interest corresponded to several information on the primary flight 
display, 1) speed indicator, 2) attitude indicator(AI), 3) heading-localizer deviation scale 
(HDG/LOC), 4) altitude-vertical speed-glide slope deviation scale (ALT/GS/VS), 5) the flight 
mode annunciator (FMA), 6) the navigation display (ND), 7) the electronic centralized aircraft 
monitor system (ECAM, including engine thrust display N1), 8) the system display system (SD), 
9) and finally the outside world via the windows.  
? 
Figure 1. Illustration of the nine different AOIs, from the First Officer point of view. First officer’s AOIs are 
represented in green and Captain’s AOIs are represented in Red. AOIs that are shared by both the First Officer and 
the Captain are in Blue. 
Procedure. All pilots performed two flights, from take-off (Toulouse runway 32 right threshold) 
to landing at Toulouse airport (LFBO) on runway 32 Right, one approach as Pilot Flying and one 
as Pilot Monitoring in a random order. After take-off, flight crews were requested to climb to 
5000 feet, turn left, and intercept the localizer and the glide slope at this altitude on the same 
airport, then, they were cleared to the approach.  
Each pilot performed as Pilot Flying and as Pilot Monitoring a full manual approach (without 
flight directors and without auto-thrust engaged) in standard visibility conditions (runway visual 
range of 550 meters).  
Stabilization criteria were as per operator manual. If the approach was unstabilized, pilots had to 
decide whether a go-around had to be performed or not. The scenario ended when the aircraft 
was fully stopped on the runway. If there was remaining time at the end of the experiment, pilots 
performed an automatic landing (with flight directors and auto-throttle engaged up to the roll out) 
in low visibility conditions (runway visual range between 75 and 400 meters). In this type of 
approach, the Captain always acts as Pilot Flying. Due to time restrictions, only six out of ten 
crews performed this scenario. 
Analyses. We only achieved statistical variance analyses for take-off scenario in standard 
visibility because this procedure has been made by all pilots, unlike the one in low visibility 
which has been made by only six flight crews due to lack of time at the end of the experiment. 
For all other procedures or maneuvers, we performed qualitative analyses as they were 
performed by only two different crews. 
 
Results  
 
Take–off: Standard visibility. Hereafter are presented gaze allocations during the take-off in 
standard visibility for both the Captain and the First Officer as Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring 
(see Figure 2 and Table 1). ANOVA showed a significant main effect of AOI (F(8, 144) = 196.70, 
p < .001, η²p = .92). In particular, the window was the most gazed AOI (LSD, p < .001 in all 8 
comparisons), with an average of 46.6% of the percentage of dwell times. ANOVA also showed 
a significant AOI x Status interaction (F(8, 144) = 3.13, p = .003, η²p = .15). Captain and First 
Officer visual circuits were quite similar (no significant main effect of the status, F < 1, p = 0.75), 
except for the speed, the ECAM, and the window (LSD, p < .001 in all 3 comparisons). For 
example, the Captain spent 12.3 % of the take-off roll gazing at the ECAM whereas the First 
Officer spent only 5.8 % on it. The AOI x Role interaction was also significant (F(8, 144) = 
44.16, p < .001, η²p = .71). When acting as Pilot Flying vs. Pilot Monitoring, pilots spent in 
average considerably more time gazing the window, respectively 64.7% vs. 28.5 % (LSD, p < 
.001), probably because visual cues are primary means to track the runway centerline. Time spent 
gazing Speed and ECAM also differed as a function of the pilots’ role (LSD, p < .001 in the two 
comparisons). Pilot Flying was less focused on these two AOIs. Finally, the AOI x Role x Status 
interaction was also significant (F(8, 144) = 3.26, p = .002, η²p = .15). When pilots acted as Pilot 
Monitoring, ECAM was the most gazed instrument with 30.3 % of the time for the Captain and 
24.2 % for the First Officer. A significant difference was also noticed concerning the speed 
indicator, it was monitored 25.7% of the time during the roll phase by the “First Officer 
monitoring” whereas it was consulted only 15% of the time by “Captain monitoring”. Other main 
effects and interactions were not significant (p > .05). 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean percentages of dwell time for each AOI during take-off for both standard and low visibility 
conditions. Dash boxes represent gaze allocation for the Captain acting as Pilot Flying (Captain is necessary Pilot 
Flying for a take-off in low visibility conditions) and the First Officer acting as Pilot Monitoring during low visibility. 
Intervals represent standard deviation from the considered subgroup. 
 
  
Table 1. Mean percentages of the most gazed main areas of interest during take-off on standard visibility. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
 
Pilots’ status and role Speed 
      Attitude     
Indicator 
ECAM  Windows 
 
Captain Flying (n=10) 
 
       
     11.6 % (8.0) 
  
 9.1 % (4.7) 
    
    12.3 % (3.8) 
   
   60,3 % (15.1) 
First Officer Flying (n=10) 
 
     12.9 % (7.7) 8.5% (8.8)    5.8 % (2.8)    63.76 % (9.9) 
Captain Monitoring (n=10) 
 
First Officer Monitoring (n=10) 
15 % (4.3) 
 
   25.7% (4.2) 
 
3.8 % (5.4) 
 
10.4% (8.4) 
30.3% (3.8) 
 
   24.2% (4.4) 
34.2 % (9.1) 
 
   21.5% (17.9) 
 
Take–off: Low Visibility. Due to lack of time at the end of the experiment, only six crews 
performed the take-off in low visibility condition. Thus, we only present qualitative results here 
(we did not perform any ANOVA). Gaze allocation for the Captain Flying and the First Officer 
Monitoring are presented Figure 2 and Table 2. The largest differences between visual patterns 
with standard and low visibility were observed for the “First Officer Monitoring”. Indeed, with 
low visibility, the Pilot Monitoring spent more time gazing at the ECAM and less time gazing 
outside the windows. More precisely, dwell time increased by 57.8 % at 38.2% of the total 
duration on the studied phase, unlike windows which decreased by 122% at 9.7% of total time. 
In addition, for the “First Officer Monitoring”, dispersion of the gaze duration on the windows 
was lower in low visibility vs. standard visibility conditions, 5.1% vs. 17.9% respectively (see 
Table 2). This is the same for the Captain Flying with a dispersion of 0.9 % vs. 8.0%, for low 
visibility vs. standard visibility conditions, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Mean percentages of time in main areas of interest during take-off on low visibility. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
 
Pilots’ status and role Speed 
      Attitude     
Indicator 
ECAM  Windows 
 
Captain Flying (n=6)  
 
First Officer Monitoring (n=6)  
 
 
8.5% (0.9) 
 
   18.2% (2.2) 
 
 
12.5 % (0.7) 
 
11.9% (3.0) 
 
11.9% (6.3) 
 
   38.2% (3.9) 
 
58.8 % (7.0) 
 
    9.7 % (5.1) 
 
Go-Around: Standard visibility. As only five crews performed a go-around, we only present 
qualitative results here (we did not perform ANOVA). We found differences of gaze allocation 
between the Pilot Flying and the Pilot Monitoring as seen on Figure 3: It appeared that Pilots 
Flying were highly focused on the attitude indicator (30.8%). Moreover, the Pilots Monitoring 
were more focused on the couple Vertical Speed / Altitude indicator (12.3%) and the flight mode 
annunciator (16,3%). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean percentages of dwell time in the different zones of interests during go-around manoeuver, Pilot 
Flying and Pilot Monitoring. Red boxes represent gaze allocation of the Pilots Flying, blue one of the Pilots 
Monitoring, and intervals represent standard deviation from the considered subgroup. 
 
Moreover, considering main instruments, gaze dispersion was considerably lower for this 
manoeuver compared to take-off during standard visibility (see Table 3). For the Pilots Flying, 
standard deviation on the attitude indicator was 2.2 % during go-around for the while it was 4.7 
and 8.8 % for the Captain and the First Officer, respectively, during the standard take-off. 
 
Table 3. Mean percentages of time in main zones of interests during go around manoeuver. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Pilots’ status and role 
 Attitude 
Indicator 
  Localizer Vs./Altitude   ECAM FMA 
 
Pilot Flying (n=5) 
 
     
    30,8 % (2.2) 
 
  
 5.4 % (2.4) 
  
 2.5 % (3.2) 
 
2.1 % (1.7) 
       1 
        16.2% (1.7) 
Pilot Monitoring (n=5) 
 
    12.1 % (2.5)  3.4% (2.5) 12.3 % (2.1) 6.7 % (2.4)     116.3%(2.0) 
 
Automatic Landing: Low visibility. As only six crews performed low visibility scenarios, we 
only present qualitative results here (we did not perform ANOVA). Considering the gaze 
allocation during the final stage of the approach, it appeared that the Pilot Flying (necessarily the 
Captain) spent more time gazing the “Windows” (72.4%), and the attitude indicator (15.7%) as 
illustrated Figure 4 (see Table 4 for summary descriptive statistics).  
 
 
Figure 4. Mean percentages of time in main zones of interests during automatic landing, Pilot Flying and Pilot 
Monitoring.  
The Pilot Monitoring (necessarily the First Officer) spent more time gazing the attitude indicator 
(26.6%), the speed (19.1%) and the ECAM (18.8%). 
 
 
Table 4. Mean percentages of dwell time in main zones of interests during automatic landing 
for the pilot flying, and monitoring. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Pilots’ status and role 
Attitude 
Indicator 
      Localizer Vs. / Glide   ECAM Windows 
 
Pilot Flying (n=6)  
 
       
    15.7 % (4.2) 
 
   
   0.2 % (0.2) 
    
    4.5 % (1.8) 
 
2.9 % (3.1) 
   
  72.4 % (16.7) 
Pilot Monitoring (n=6)  
 
     26.6 % (5.8)   3.4% (2.7)    11.3 % (1.8)   18.8 % (2.1)     2.4 % (1.3) 
 
   
 
As shown in Table 4, dispersion is particularly low considering the Pilot Flying gazing the 
localizer (0.2%) and the glide (1.8%) compared to results published in a previous study on these 
instruments by (Lefrancois and al., 2016). A similar remark can be made for the Pilot Monitoring 
gazing ILS deviation scale, the ECAM (2.1%) and the windows (1.3%).  
 
 
Non-Normal Maneuvers: Standard visibility. One crew experienced a low energy alarm and 
another one experienced a sink rate alarm during the approaches (thus we only present qualitative 
results here). The first one was a warning enhanced by the airplane. In fact, the aircraft flight 
augmentation computer computes the aircraft energy level, and issues an aural low energy alert 
to warn the pilots when the energy level becomes too low. In the situation presented in Figure 5, 
pilots where in turn, about to intercept the localizer at 5000ft. Only one crew faced this situation. 
 
 
Figure 5. Percentages of dwell time in main zones of interests during speed recovery manoeuver, Pilot Flying and 
Pilot Monitoring (one crew). 
 
It appears that during final turn, at constant altitude, both pilots were significantly gazing the 
attitude indicator during respectively 44.3 % and 44.4% of the event (6.21 seconds). Gaze 
allocation of the Pilot Flying has been focused during 26.3% of the manoeuver on the localizer 
deviation scale, and dwell time of the Pilot Monitoring was also focused on this instrument during 
15.2%. In addition, they under-focused the speed and the ECAM, where thrust is displayed.  
 
The second warning was a sink rate triggered by the ground proximity warning system during 
the final stage of the approach. One crew faced this situation. Considering the rate of descent in 
feet/minute when the radio altimeter becomes alive, the system may issue first a sink rate alarm 
followed by a pull up maneuver request if there is a no action from the flight crew.  
 
Concerning this alarm, gaze allocation was recorded between 100 and 50 ft. Both Pilot Flying 
and Pilot Monitoring were strongly focused on the aiming marks during 88% and 71% of the 
selected approach time, respectively, as appreciated on Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Percentages of dwell time in main zones of interests during path recovery manoeuver, Pilot Flying and 
Pilot Monitoring (one crew). 
 
Discussion/Conclusions  
 
The objective of the study was to characterize monitoring strategies regarding pilot’s status and 
pilot’s role through different highly demanding maneuvers. To this aim, twenty operational pilots 
qualified on Airbus A320 were recruited to perform two scenarios in a full simulator experiment. 
 
Take-off on standard and low visibility. According to Boeing’s statistics (2010), from 2001 to 
2010, 13 % of fatal accidents occurred during take-off. This part of the flight is very sensitive 
since visual attention is highly solicited in order to detect potential abnormalities in the 
parameters. Time pressure is high, and decisions to abort take-off have to be performed very fast 
in order to avoid dangerous events such as tire blowout or runway excursion. The take-off is a 
particular phase of the flight because only the Captain can make the decision to reject the take-
off or not. The rejected take-off (RTO) is a maneuver performed during the take-off roll if the 
Captain estimates that the take-off should not be continued before reaching the decision speed 
V1, maximum speed at which the RTO maneuver can be initiated, and the aircraft stopped within 
the remaining field length. If an engine failure (or a wind-shear or an unsafe or unable to fly 
state) is recognized at or after decision speed, the take-off must be continued within the remaining 
take-off distance.   
 
Regarding pilots’ role, we observed that the Pilot Monitoring allocated his attention more on 
speed and ECAM, and less to the windows, compared to the Pilot Flying. Regarding pilots’ 
status, time devoted to each area of interest was globally similar for Captains and First Officers 
except for the ECAM, which was more gazed by the Captain when flying or monitoring. This 
high visual allocation on the ECAM by the Captain can be explained by the fact that the decision 
to reject take off is mainly associated with engine parameters, and alarms. These are essentials 
parameters during take-off roll, to make fast and appropriate decision regarding its possible 
abortion. 
 
A deeper analysis revealed that speed indicator and ECAM display were differently gazed 
depending on both pilots’ role and status. Indeed, the “First Officer Monitoring” spent more time 
gazing the speed indicator than the Captain Monitoring, and the Captain Monitoring allocated 
more visual attention to the ECAM than the First Officer Monitoring.  
 
We could initially expect a different gaze behavior regarding role and status on airspeed because 
the Pilot Monitoring announces speed during roll and the Pilot Flying crosschecks and confirms 
the speed indicated at 100 knots: at this moment, the Pilot Monitoring addresses its attention to 
monitor systems, and particularly engine parameters. When pilots were monitoring, the ECAM 
was frequently gazed, and differences between roles on this instrument were substantial. In 
chronological order, ECAM became the most gazed instrument around 100 knots because below 
this speed, the Captain may decide to abort the take-off depending on the circumstances. Above 
this speed, rejecting take-off is a more serious matter that is why this speed is a turning point 
from a monitoring point of view. 
 
During low visibility procedures, for many airlines, the Captain is mandatorily the Pilot Flying 
for the take-off but this policy may change according to visibility, and operator manual.  
Comparing take-off on low visibility with standard one, dispersion of gaze durations was lower 
for First Officer Monitoring, specifically for the windows. This was also the case for the Captain 
as Pilot Flying, specifically for the speed and attitude indicator. These differences with take-off 
on standard visibility conditions can be associated to the criticality of any alarms or failures that 
may happen in low visibility, and particularly runway excursion.  
 
Go-around procedures: During the session, five out of the 20 pilots had flown an unstabilized 
approach, and decided to go-around. The Pilots Flying over-focused the attitude indicator 
(explained by the necessity to fly the aircraft first with the appropriate path), the FMA and the 
speed, unlike the pilot monitoring that over-focused the FMA, the altitude indicator and the 
navigation display. Hereafter, it can be conjectured that the cockpit seemed divided between the 
pilot who deals with the trajectory and the pilot who deals with the configuration and the 
navigation (This segregation corresponds to the standard manoeuver, which consists in flying the 
correct path, and ensure that automatisms are correctly engaged), that is why, even if the 
procedure is classified as normal, recurrent training is necessary because crew resource 
management is of the most important parameter. Our results are consistent with those published 
by (Adam and al., 2013).  
 
Reasons of the unstabilized approach have been explained in a previous study (Lefrancois and 
al., 2016): Gaze allocation analysis of pilots who pulled up vs. the most accurate pilots of the 
experiment revealed that gaze allocation of primary flying instruments were at least twice as 
large than for most accurate pilots. These pilots over, and under-focused different primary 
instruments to the detriment of others in this dynamic phase of the flight.  
 
Study of visual attention during go-around is also similar to (Dehais and al., 2017): During go-
around, pilots spent less time on the outside world, redistributing gaze allocation on the airspeed 
indicator due to pitch concern during full thrust application, and on the navigation display to 
strictly follow the missed approach trajectory on busy airport environment. 
 
Automatic landing during low visibility: Low visibility procedures exist to support low visibility 
operations at aerodrome when either surface visibility is sufficiently low to prejudice safe ground 
movement without additional procedural controls or the prevailing cloud base is sufficiently low 
to preclude pilots obtaining the required visual references. 
Landing the aircraft into low visibility conditions requires automatic landing. In this specific 
phase of flight, crew duties are clearly specified: Captain is always the Pilot Flying, First Officer 
the Pilot Monitoring. This phase of flight requires the Captain to monitor flight parameters up to 
the final stage, during which he has to look outside for visual references. At the same time, the 
First Officer has to monitor all flight parameters inside the cockpit up to the roll out, looking for 
any abnormal parameters, glide deviation or automation malfunction. 
It clearly appears that a specific repartition was required to deal with this type of approach. First 
of all, captains were particularly looking outside searching for visual references to complete the 
approach whereas the Pilot Monitoring supervised all systems, particularly glide path deviation 
and the ECAM in order to detect a failure.  
 
Sensitive maneuvers: Two different crews experienced unstabilized approach but some of them 
faced procedures that required particular attention: “Speed”, and “Sink rate” wake-up call 
resulted from an incorrect path, and an irrelevant monitoring by these crews: These events were 
the results of an inadequate gaze allocation for each basic flying instrument during the approach 
for both Pilots Flying and Monitoring roles. Both pilots were considerably focused on the pitch 
attitude to maintain altitude in turn and the ILS interception regarding the “speed” alarm. 
 
Concerning sink rate alarm, a result of this over-focalization was a decrease of the pitch attitude 
in very short final (minus four degrees on approach compared to a mean value of two degrees 
considering the aircraft weight, and configuration), and consequently an increase of the vertical 
speed without thrust adjustment. In fact, it appears that the Pilot Monitoring did not take into 
consideration parameters inside the cockpit during the final stage of the approach (Speed, vertical 
speed and pitch attitude) when the pilot was flying the path and under focusing the attitude 
indicator also. Both pilots were strongly focused on the aiming mark during the “sink rate”. 
 
Crew reactions facing unstabilized approaches: Despite these remarks, 100 % of unstabilized 
approach ended up by a decision to go-around; the experiment did not record any “procedure 
violation”. In fact, continuation of an unstabilized approach is regularly observed (Causse and 
al., 2013), and has been found to be a causal factor in 40 % of all approaches and landing fatal 
accidents (Flight Safety Foundation, 2009). Therefore, our sample of pilots was really aware of 
stabilization requirements and did not hesitate to make the decision to go-around when necessary. 
Moreover, the experimentation was conducted in marginal weather conditions (that is to say 
minimum visibility, and strong crosswind) compatible with a manual landing, so the rate of 
unstabilized approached does not seem to be particularly high according to visibility conditions 
and crosswind values.  
 
Limits of the study: Furthermore, due to well-known accuracy limitations of the eye–tracking 
system, it was not possible to differentiate between the heading and the localizer; a similar 
statement has been made for the altitude which could not be differentiated from the glide / vertical 
speed couple. Nevertheless, it can be hypothesized that radio altimeter keeps the pilot aware of 
the height of the aircraft above the runway, so this differentiation was not essential for the study. 
 
Another limit is the sample size of the study. Only five flight crews performed a go-around and 
two experienced warning events. It might be interesting to study gaze allocation and visual 
pattern during these procedures on a more significant number of pilots. 
 
Perspectives of the study 
 
It should be interesting to know if pilots would appreciate that manufacturer published 
monitoring strategies for some procedures or maneuvers to help them being more efficient, and 
increase awareness of the crew. The question should be asked for each specific role, as Pilot 
Flying or Monitoring, because during these procedures, the Pilot Flying is responsible for attitude 
changes, and the Pilot Monitoring supervises flight path, automation engagement or weather 
condition. For example, during a wind-shear escape maneuver, we could expect a monitoring 
pattern which enhanced the wind direction and the rate of climb (with specific call out to bring 
any concern to the other pilot attention), the automatism engagement and the flight mode 
annunciator. This scan flow could help Pilots Monitoring to check all relevant parameters 
through optimized visual patterns.  
 
Concerning the study of the take-off, it could be interesting to perform an analysis of take-off 
roll with a failure associated to a specific environmental context (such as contaminated runway 
or flock of bird mentioned in the ATIS) to study visual patterns approaching decision speed, and 
associated decision making. It could help to design interacting systems assisting the pilots to 
make an appropriate decision in this dynamic context. 
 
According to present findings, it would be interesting to develop a short training about the 
different maneuvers discussed on this work, and measure differences after a second experiment 
with similar scenarios. It could be interesting to study monitoring strategies development if pilots 
whose gaze allocation is sub optimal take into consideration dwell time of pilots who detect 
discrepancies efficiently. It can be assumed that, if less efficient pilots take into consideration 
tactics and visual patterns of the more reliable pilots, rate of unstabilized approached, and alarm 
would probably decrease. Another development currently under researches is to associate gaze 
allocation and transition between the different flying instruments to study kinematic of visual 
patterns during these specific phases of flight and maneuvers. We are currently working on a 
reeducation program to improve flight performance through visual pattern strategy and gaze 
allocation monitoring. 
 
Another question is to know if the gaze allocation of the Pilots Monitoring during automatic 
approaches should be the most efficient way to detect any deviation during the approach, 
particularly if a manual landing is performed. In fact, their gaze allocation is evenly distributed 
between all flying instruments and aircraft systems up to the flare, with a minimum time spend 
on the outside world though the windows. We could assume that if all Pilots Monitoring would 
have applied these gaze allocation strategies during unstabilized approach, rate of go-around 
would have decreased, and alarms issued by the aircraft would have not been recorded. A similar 
conclusion has been made by (Reynal and al., 2016). They suggested that Pilots Monitoring 
visual behavior was not optimal regarding the prioritization of the flight parameters. During final 
stage of the approach, they noticed that Pilots Monitoring were spending approximately 35 % of 
the time on the external view, but they should keep their head down to monitor critical flight 
parameters. This finding could be explained by the automation confidence leading the pilot to 
over rely on automation to deal with thrust adjustments and attitude computation through the 
flight directors.   
 
Main problem remains that monitoring is never taught during initial and recurrent training. Even 
if some visual patterns are depicted during initial training, and during the first flight into IMC, 
scanning strategies are no more taught during the pilots' career. Some studies, (Adam and al., 
2013) also concluded that it should be necessary for manufacturers, and operators to define 
together a visual scan that would optimize crew teamwork during some phases of the flight, 
particularly the go-around procedure. These patterns could help pilots to manage time spent on 
each instrument during the approach and associated cinematic. In this context, eye-tracking 
technology could be very useful in recurrent training to increase consciousness of pilots. 
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